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The analysis of the demographic transition of the past century and a half, using both empiri-
cal data and mathematical models, has rendered a wealth of well-established facts, including the
dramatic increases in life expectancy. Despite these insights, such analyses have also occasionally
triggered debates which spill over many disciplines, from genetics, to biology, or demography. Per-
haps the hottest discussion is happening around the question of maximum human lifespan, which
–besides its fascinating historical and philosophical interest– poses urgent pragmatic warnings on a
number of issues in public and private decision-making. In this paper, we add to the controversy
some results which, based on purely statistical grounds, suggest that the maximum human lifespan
is not fixed, or has not reached yet a plateau. Quite the contrary, analysis on reliable data for over
150 years in more than 20 industrialized countries point at a sustained increase in the maximum age
at death. Furthermore, were this trend to continue, a limitless lifespan could be achieved by 2102.
Finally, we quantify the dependence of increases in the maximum lifespan on socio-economic factors.
Our analysis indicates that in some countries the observed rising patterns can only be sustained by
progressively larger increases in GDP, setting the problem of longevity in a context of diminishing
returns.
BACKGROUND
With an increasing reliability, abundance and availabil-
ity of demographic data over the past century, scientists
have managed to deliver and agree on a number of facts.
First and foremost is the evidence for a sharp increase in
life expectancy all along the 20th century [1, 2]. With all
the implications it bears –from social planning to climate
change–, average human lifespan is not particularly re-
vealing in a biological sense: certainly, the increases we
have witnessed have more to do with our capacity to ma-
nipulate the environment (e.g. medical advances, a stable
and balanced diet, labor conditions [3–5]), than changes
in the biology of the species. In this sense, scientific ad-
vances seem to have outrun evolution. However, as we
live longer, a natural question arises: is there an inherent
limit to human life? If so, are we approaching it?
These simple questions have triggered a long and hot
debate, which is not settled. Part of the debate happens
in the biological arena, where some theories on ageing
processes conclude that these are inescapable [6] and ul-
timately fatal, e.g. antagonistic pleiotropy or disposable
soma theory. On the contrary, others claim that there
is no physical restriction preventing an indefinite post-
ponement to senescence [6]. Indeed, ageing processes
do not seem to be pervasive in nature [7–9]. Lifespan
may not be an absolute hard limit, but a function of
other parameters, which include the environment where
we live (in the broader sense) and our capacity to alter
it [10–12]. While the evolution of life expectancy seems
to support precisely this view –lifespan as a function of
the environment–, at least on statistical grounds, we still
lack a conclusive biological argument around maximum
human lifespan.
In the meantime, scholars have turned to data again
–this time to tackle the question of human life’s upper-
bounds, rather than expectation. In a recent work [13], it
was claimed that human lifespan limit has already been
reached, and such limit was set at 115. However, se-
rious methodological concerns were quickly raised [14–
17], projecting a shadow of doubt and jeopardizing the
main conclusions. We should keep in sight that estimates
for lifespan limits –either in terms of life expectancy or
maximum lifespan– have been broken in the past, while
others have not yet been exceeded [18]. From a statis-
tically less naive point of view, implied distributions of
raw maximum ages at death could be predicted directly
in the context of parametric models for hazard functions:
for Gompertz, Gamma-Gompertz, Makeham, Gamma-
Gompertz-Makeham, or others [19], the distribution of
maximum age within a birth cohort of, say, size n at
age 50 is readily available. However, the distinctive be-
haviour of distributions at their extreme tails have long
been one of the reasons that most demographers reject
Gompertz models as a description of survival to extreme
ages: maximum lifespan is an extreme value statistic, and
therefore particularly affected by sample size [20].
In this paper, we take a Big Data approach to ana-
lyze demographic and mortality data under the light of
extreme value statistics. We do so for datasets of more
than 20 countries, with over a century of reliable infor-
mation. Results tell us that maximum lifespan is not
fixed, but has rather evolved in a steep linear increas-
ing tendency for the last 60 years –in correspondence
with post-World War II general progress. Projecting the
trends into the future, maximum lifespan might become
unbounded within the next 100 years. These trends, we
hypothesize, may have gone previously unnoticed due to
the Simpson’s paradox. In the second part of the article,
we relate maximum lifespan extension to standardized
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Results evidence that,
in some countries, the increment of the GDP has a di-
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2minishing returns effect on maximum lifespan. However,
interestingly, the effect does not seem to be neither heav-
ily related to the maximum lifespan nor to the absolute
GDP value.
DATA DESCRIPTION
We combine the information from the Human Mor-
tality Database (HMD) [21], the International Database
on Longevity (IDL) [22] (1750-2014), and the Gerontol-
ogy Wiki (GW) [23] for a representative set of countries.
The HMD reports the number of deaths per calendar
year and age up to 109 years, aggregating counts hence-
forth. This dataset does not specify the exact death date
of individuals. The IDL and GW complement the HMD
dataset. IDL reports data only for super-centenarians
(≥ 110 years old) with the exact demise date. With
similar aims, GW mostly overlaps with IDL, but com-
prehends a number of countries which are not in IDL.
The previous data are segmented in death cohorts, i.e.
people who died on the same calendar year. Death co-
horts guarantee that life conditions during the last period
of life are shared among the population –opposite to birth
cohorts, which are more suited in other settings. Addi-
tionally, death cohorts allow us to extend the analysis to
year 2014. Death cohorts have been previously used in
[1, 13, 24].
On the merged dataset, we apply a block maxima
method to each calendar year –death cohort–. Each block
corresponds to a day. Since we do not have exact date
of birth and death for individuals below 110 years, we
randomly cast HMD data to a daily distribution, given
the seasonal birth and death distribution obtained from
UNdata (http://data.un.org/). On top of the random
sample, we add the values for which death date is known
(≥ 110, IDL and GW). With this distribution at hand,
the obtained samples are fitted, using maximum likeli-
hood, to estimate the GEV distribution parameters. The
reported parameters of the GEV distribution for each co-
hort are averaged over 200 random realizations to ensure
statistical significant results.
RESULTS
We start by analysing the existence of an inherent limit
to longevity throughout the results presented in Figure 1.
Left panels report the expected maximum lifespan ω, for
the set of studied countries, as a function of calendar
year. Such estimate ω corresponds here to the first mo-
ment of fitted Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) distri-
bution, see Methods for details. With few exceptions,
presented in the bottom panels, maximum lifespan has
monotonically risen for over 100 years. Furthermore, this
increasing trend has consistently grown at a linear pace
in the last 60 years, with correlation coefficients in the
range 0.96 ≤ r2 ≤ 0.99 for all countries. Despite the dif-
ferent slopes, which are indicative of the varied historical
trajectories of the countries, the observed pattern is sub-
stantial and persistent. This linear behavior is perfectly
compatible with the one reported for life expectancy [2]
and mortality at advanced ages [25]. Also, it is aligned
with the increase in the variation in lifespan among sur-
vivors to older ages (e.g. 65 and above) [26].
Besides remarkably high Pearson coefficients for the
period 1960-2014, the slopes of these linear trends be-
long to the narrow range 0.11± 0.05, implying a similar
growing trend for these subset of countries. The differ-
ence in the intercept of such trend (vertical shifts) may
be explained by the richness of the sample in the ex-
treme values: smaller countries present less instances of
extreme age than those with larger populations. Fig-
ure S1 of the Supplementary Information illustrates this
point, confronting ωt (t ∈ [1960, 2014]) with population
at year t.
Countries with longer historical data show a smooth
change of tendency from decreasing to increasing af-
ter 1850-1900. Without a deep analysis of the socio-
economic and political situation of each country, the most
plausible explanation for this convex shape is improved
hygiene, public health, medicine, nutrition, and technol-
ogy. In any case, the sharply increasing trends obtained
under the light of GEV statistics, after 1960, differ largely
from the evolution of life expectancy, which is valuable
to anticipate general trends (see Figure S2 of the Sup-
plementary Information) –but not extreme scores, which
demand a different treatment.
The right panels of Figure 1 report on the theoretical
estimation of maximum human lifespan [24, 27], accord-
ing to the fitted distribution. In particular, when the
shape parameter of the fitted GEV distribution is lower
than zero, ξ < 0, the distribution is equivalent to a re-
versed Weibull, characterized by a finite upper bound
ω∗; any non-negative value leads to a Gumbel (ξ = 0)
or a Fre´chet (ξ > 0) distribution, which lack a defined
upper bound. The maximum likelihood estimates of the
GEV parameters consistently indicates that the best dis-
tribution fitting our data is, unsurprisingly, the reversed
Weibull and consequently the GEV has a well defined
upper bound. Despite its noisy nature –slight changes in
the shape parameter ξ translate into large shifts of ω∗–
, this maximalist estimation shows as well an increasing
behavior, with values ranging from 105 to more than 140.
Additionally, top panels show the results considering
all the available data for all countries. Note the behavior
of ω and ω∗ after the 60’s. The expected maximum lifes-
pan evidences a deterioration, and the theoretical upper
bound shows a stationary behavior. None of these are
observed in the per-country analyses. This discrepancy
is a consequence of the Simpson’s paradox, which can
explain misleading results when data are considered at
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FIG. 1. Expected and theoretical maximum lifespan. Panel A and C report on the expected maximum lifespan for each
cohort for all countries under scrutiny. Panel C shows the 3 countries where we observe an anomalous behavior: US, Russia and
Slovakia. The expected maximum lifespan ω corresponds to the first moment of the GEV distribution that best fits empirical
mortality data, including centenarians and super-centenarians. Notably, all trends show an growing tendency for maximum
lifespan, with a clear linear regime from mid-20th century onwards. For the same period of time, panels B and D displays the
theoretical upper-bound ω∗ of the fitted GEV distribution that, in all cases, correspond to a reversed Weibull (see Methods).
Considering the noise observed in the evolution of ω∗ and the amount of countries analysed we present this evolution in terms
of a heat-map. The intensity of the points correspond to the amount of countries that display this ω∗ at that year. This
theoretical extreme also presents a rising pattern. The evolution of ω∗ for the anomalous countries is presented in panel D.
the aggregate level; it might also underlie the polemical
results in [13].
As shown in Figure 1, 3 out of the 23 countries show
a deterioration of their maximum lifespan.
Noteworthy, US sets a global maximum ω = 109 in
year 1990 showing a decline afterwards despite not set-
ting the theoretical global maximum (larger ω∗). Inset of
Figure 1 explores this particular empirical trend, zoom-
ing on the calendar years where the maximum is reached.
As said, the expected maximum lifespan shows a non-
monotonic behavior between the range [1980, 2014], im-
plying that the average value in the fitted GEV distri-
bution appears to have stalled around age 109. This is
also reflected in the distribution’s upper bound ω∗, which
shows an oscillating trend.
The evolution of the maximum lifespan of Russia is
clearly different from US. It shows an oscillating behavior
that seem to follow the different socio-political and eco-
nomical situation of the Soviet Union. It is worth letting
know to the reader that before the Soviet Union disso-
lution only citizens, centenarians and super-centenarians
that live in the future Russian territory are considered.
The evolution we observe is as follows. A monotonic
decrease in the 60’s and 70’s corresponding to the de-
Stalinization era. Around the Stagnation era (1973-1985)
we observe a monotonic increase of the lifespan. The
Stagnation era was economically adverse but seem to
provide enough stability to sustain elders life and their
health. The maximum lifespan was increased by approxi-
mately two years. Afterwards a significant decrease, con-
temporary to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, is ob-
served. This decrease reduced 5 years of maximum lifes-
pan in 10 years. Intriguingly, this oscillation behavior is
not observed in the life expectancy on age tables for the
4elder population. However, it is indeed reflected in the
life expectancy at younger ages, the range [0, 40]. See
Figure 1 of the Supplementary Material.
Slovakia also shows a decreasing trend after 2010. The
reduction is not acute and may possibly be a delayed
consequence of the economical crisis of 2007.
The evolution of the maximum lifespan of US, Slovakia,
and the particular case of Russia, evidence to what ex-
tent the socio-economic and political situation affects life
conditions of the elder and consequently affecting the ob-
served maximum lifespan similarly to the control of the
environment does to life expectancy [28].
The generalized increasing trends of ω and ω∗ suggest
that, if there is, a natural limit to human lifespan has not
been reached yet. To to further investigate the evolution
of ω∗, we resort on the shape parameter ξ which dictates
the theoretical upper bound of the GEV distribution. As
can be observed in Figure 2A, ξ is strictly negative for all
countries and so the upper bound (i.e. maximum lifes-
pan) is well defined. The anecdotal four points outside
the range, ξ > 0, are regarded as noise since do not show
neither any regularity nor tendency. The linear fit over
the plot is a visual guide to indicate the general parsimo-
nious increasing tendency of ξ towards positive values.
Figure 2b and Table I display, for each country, the lin-
ear fit of the evolution of ξ values from the initial to the
final calendar years available. If ξ evolution presented a
flat shape (slope of ξ = 0) and below 0 value, it would
indicate an approximation of ω∗ towards an asymptotic
barrier or “wall of death” [29]. Quite the contrary, we ob-
serve a robust growing trend of the ξ parameter towards
positive values, with the notable exceptions of 5 coun-
tries. Nonetheless, the only significantly negative slope
happens to be in Japan. We remark that, upon reaching
ξ ≥ 0, the distribution (now a Fre´chet or Gumbel) ceases
to be upper-bounded, which translates into a tendency
for human lifespan to diverge. It seems then that, for
most countries, ξ shows a rising pattern –though admit-
tedly at different pace.
A deeper analysis of Figure 2 and Table I show that
two of the countries with larger lifespan present neg-
ative slopes. This might evidence a saturation and a
subsequent decrease of the maximum lifespan once their
maximum value is reached. To address this question, we
present in Figure 3 a scatter plot showing the relation-
ship between the maximum obtained lifespan, max. ω,
and the slope of the ξ parameter. The overall obtained
results indicate that there is no clear relationship be-
tween the reached maximum lifespan the observed slope
in the ξ parameter. Thus the observed decrease seems to
remove:(must) depend on other factors rather than the
current maximum lifespan.
Finally, we use forecasting techniques to uncover long-
term trends (rather than predictions). At this point, the
central question is not about how long humans can live,
but rather when longevity could potentially diverge. A
linear projection of the growth shows that an unbounded
longevity is expected be reached by year 2102. More
advanced prediction techniques such as ARIMA or neural
networks could be used, but in general these techniques
are meant for short-term trends and long-term usually
coincide with linear models. Table I contains per-country
information regarding the projected ξ evolution slope,
and the corresponding boundaries of the 95% confidence
interval.
Country ∆ξ (×10−4) 95% bounds y. div.
australia 4.03 (1.22e-4,6.83e-4) 2372
austria 5.04 (3.9e-5,9.69e-4) 2245
belgium 3.10 (2.17e-4,4.03e-4) 2469
canada 6.91 (3.93e-4,9.89e-4) 2157
czech -0.43 (-5.47e-4,4.61e-4) Inf
denmark 4.19 (3.12e-4,5.26e-4) 2389
finland 4.72 (2.95e-4,6.49e-4) 2321
france 1.55 (5.8e-5,2.51e-4) 2745
hungary 10.4 (5.12e-4,1.56e-3) 2128
ireland 11.4 (6.68e-4,1.62e-3) 2152
italy 4.34 (3.02e-4,5.66e-4) 2211
japan -8.93 (-1.34e-3,-4.48e-4) Inf
netherlands 4.74 (3.63e-4,5.86e-4) 2271
newzealand -0.58 (-6.43e-4,5.28e-4) Inf
norway 7.85 (6.74e-4,8.95e-4) 2188
portugal 0.22 (-3.86e-4,4.29e-4) 8076
slovakia -3.16 (-7.50e-4,1.18e-4) Inf
spain 6.94 (3.65e-4,1.02e-3) 2102
sweden 4.04 (3.50e-4,4.58e-4) 2311
switzerland 3.59 (2.23e-4,4.95e-4) 2418
uk 3.29 (6.5e-5,5.93e-4) 2309
us -3.10 (-1.32e-5,6.96e-4) Inf
TABLE I. Shape parameter ξ evolution as forecasted by a
linear model. For each country, the slope and confidence in-
tervals are detailed. Last column corresponds to the predicted
year the theoretical upper bound will diverge.
Figures 2 and 3 may convey the (false) idea that
the shape parameter ξ naturally evolves independently of
other factors. However, similar to life expectancy and in-
come per capita [30], lifespan and Gross Domestic Prod-
uct (GDP) are also expected to be intertwined in some
intriguing way. Differently to live expectancy, we do not
expect a direct mutually reinforcing relationship since we
are focusing on the tail of the live expectancy distribu-
tion; and, this contains advance age citizens that do not
directly contribute to the increase of GDP. The fact that
changes in the maximum lifespan –or life expectancy,
for that matter– depend ultimately on our capacity to
modify ageing processes. The evolution of ξ comes at a
cost: the cost of decreasing our vulnerability to disease as
senescence progresses. Parallel to the research lines in [3–
5, 31, 32], we now relate lifespan statistics to nation-wise
socio-economic indicators. Acknowledging that GDP is
just a rough proxy to how much a country invests in
medical research and technology, social welfare and the
adoption of healthy habits, among others, Figure 4 (panel
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FIG. 2. Temporal evolution of the shape parameter ξ. Panel A show the evolution in form of a heat-map of the ξ
parameter of the fitted GEV distribution. The intensity of each point correspond to the amount of countries that display this
ξ parameter at that year. The solid black line corresponds to the linear fit of the evolution of the ξ value. Panel B show the
individual evolution of ξ for each country in terms of its linear fit. The transparency of each line in panel B is proportional to
the magnitude of the slope. Decreasing trends are displayed as dashed lines.
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FIG. 3. Relationship between expected maximum
lifespan and evolution of ξ parameter. The maximum
lifespan corresponds to the expected maximum obtained for
all analysed years for each country. The slope of ξ corresponds
to the slope of linear fits in Figure 2 which are also reported
in Table I.
A) describes the relationship between increases in ω and
increases GDP [33]. Note that both axis have been con-
veniently normalized. The general trend for all countries
is a rising one, and aligned with previous findings on sim-
ilar issues [34]. Interestingly, the dependence of ω on the
GDP does show a saturation, which conveys the idea of
diminishing returns, i.e. constant additions of the GDP
yield progressively smaller increases in expected maxi-
mum lifespan.
Furthermore, we highlight in panel A three trajecto-
ries. The orange trend (lowest) corresponds to Hungary,
and displays an almost linear growth of ω with GDP.
The green trend (middle) corresponds to Denmark and
roughly represents the average behavior (as solid black
line) of the whole dataset –in the context of diminishing
returns. Finally, the brown trend (top) corresponds to
US, which exceptionally displays negative returns as the
cumulated GDP reaches its maximum. This phenom-
ena is typically observed when we focus on the relation
of life expectation on economically-developed countries
with very large GDP [35].
We might expect that countries that reach larger lifes-
pan exhibit more acute diminishing returns phenomena.
To further look into this relation, Figure 4B plots the
relationship between the maximum obtained lifespan on
each country and the distance of the GDP − ω relation-
ship to the average. The results evidence that there is
no actual relationship between these two measures. This
rises the hypothesis that the diminishing returns phe-
nomena observed here is more related to what extent gov-
ernments invest in, and citizens accept, socio-economic
and technological advances to improve their health and,
eventually, their lifespan.
CONCLUSIONS
As demographic data becomes more available and more
reliable, our capacity to deliver better analysis can in-
crease in multiple dimensions: deeper in the past, further
in terms national or regional populations, and wider in
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terms of the issues relevant to demography itself (pub-
lic health access, income inequality, etc.). This leap for-
ward is possible through initiatives like the UN Data, the
World Bank Open Data, or the OECD Data; but also
through more specialized efforts like the Human Mortal-
ity Database or the International Database on Longevity.
Here, we propose a statistical exercise that addresses the
question on whether maximum human lifespan is nat-
urally bounded –as some studies suggest–, or not. To
do so, we analyse the historical trends of the maximum
reported age at death for as far as 150 years, and 23 coun-
tries. This analysis is sensitive to the fact that maximum
death ages are extreme values –increasingly extreme, if
we consider the latest trends in age-of-death variability
[26]–, and as such we exploit dedicated statistical tech-
niques, such as those that stem from Extreme Value The-
ory.
The resulting scenario is not that of a fixed barrier
to maximum lifespan, but rather a divergent trend in
longevity. The existence of an upper bound of the re-
versed Weibull distribution –which best represents ex-
treme age values for an overwhelming amount of years of
data– conveys the misleading idea that there is a natural
threshold to human lifespan. However, such threshold
shows an increasing behavior for many countries. This
suggests that our changing lifestyle and capacity to con-
trol our surrounding environment pushes forward, fur-
ther every year, the mentioned barrier –which would, at
least from a statistical point of view, eventually vanish.
We explicitly remark that our results are the product
of a statistical exercise, and as such we make no claims
around the underlying biological mechanisms (genetic or
otherwise) that determine human lifespan. Note, how-
ever, that these two disjoint approaches seem to converge
[36–38].
Indeed, an evolving maximum lifespan leads to two
possible interpretations: either there is no natural limit
to human longevity, or such limit is not yet visible in
a short- or mid-term horizon. We address this dilemma
studying the changes in the shape parameter ξ of the
GEV distribution per calendar year. The projection of
ξ to the future is a helpful tool to estimate if, how, and
when, longevity may diverge. If anything, lifespan limit
should be studied from an evolutive and dynamical per-
spective.
Restraining any euphoric trust in a prospected life di-
vergence in the near future, two facts stand out from
our work. First, the stubborn singularity of the trends
in ex-communist countries and US data (ironically, the
most advanced industrialized nation among the studied
ones), which indicate that maximum lifespan has stalled
for the past decades; and, furthermore, that improve-
ments in their economic status in the last 30 years may
have rendered decreased lifespan expectations. Second, a
non-linear relationship between maximum expected lifes-
pan and GDP suggests that the fight to postpone death
is increasingly costly, in the logic of diminishing returns.
Our results come, admittedly, from GDP as a gross proxy
of the level of development in a country. Breaking down
such approximation to relevant features –public health
investment, fair wealth redistribution, healthy lifestyle–
may give deeper insights on the problem but is far beyond
7the scope of the present work.
All of these results have, potentially, profound impli-
cations for individuals, society and the economy [39]. Di-
vergent or not, chances are that humans will witness fur-
ther increases in their maximum lifespan. As this popula-
tion of centenarians and super-centenarians becomes sta-
tistically non-negligible, the challenges to sustain health
and pension spending will increase sharply, raising con-
cerns over how to provide care for increasing numbers of
older people. If nothing else, the statistical examination
proposed here should raise awareness among policy mak-
ers who, ultimately, must design the strategies to sustain
functioning health-care systems.
METHODS
Extreme Value Theory
The problem of modelling extreme events arises in
many areas –often related to rare weather episodes, i.e.
extreme floods or high wind speeds, and large financial
fluctuations such as market crashes. It is in these con-
texts that extreme value theorem has been mostly ex-
ploited [40] –but also in demography [24, 41, 42]. The
main result from the extreme value theorem is that the
maximum of a sample of i.i.d. random variables can only
converge in distribution to one of 3 possible distributions,
i.e. the Fre´chet, the Gumbel, or the reversed Weibull
distribution. These three are wrapped under the Gener-
alized Extreme Value (GEV) distribution [40],
1/σ
t
(x)ξ+1e−t(x) (1)
where Parameter µ controls the location of the distribu-
tion and it closely related to the first moment of the dis-
tribution. Parameter σ determines the deviation of the
distribution. And, the shape parameter ξ determines to
which distribution the data fit: Fre´chet (ξ > 0), Gumbel
(ξ = 0), or reversed Weibull (ξ < 0).
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I. Average maximum lifespan as a function of population size
This section analyses the dependance of our results with respect to the sam-
pling procedure and the underlying population size. In other words, we in-
spect here to what extent maximum lifespan is affected by country population
size.
Figure S1 plots the expected maximum lifespan (as per fitted distribution)
against population size. Each country is represented as a different colour, and
results correspond to the period 1960-2014. The left-most country (dark red)
is New Zealand; on the right, grey dots correspond to Japan, and black ones
(right-most) to U.S. For every country, the lowest ω value corresponds to t =
1960. In general, the highest ω corresponds to t = 2014 (with the exception of
U.S.).
The main conclusion from this figure is the lack of an obvious relation-
ship between maximum lifespan and population. Taken individually, all coun-
tries (except U.S.) have witnessed dramatic increases in their maximum lifes-
pan expectations, regardless of their population growth patterns. For instance,
New Zealand (which doubled its population in the 1960-2014 period), Hun-
gary (with a receding population in the same period), and Japan (with a very
stable population in the last 40 years) show similar trends regarding maximum
lifespan. In the opposite trend we find U.S.: doubling its population in the pe-
riod 1960-2014, its maximum expected lifespan has overall increased –though
very moderately–, appears to have reached a plateau (and even, at times, to
decrease).
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Figure S1: Expected maximum lifespan (as per fitted distribution) against pop-
ulation size. Each country is represented as a different colour, and results
shown for the period 1960-2014. The left-most country (dark red) is New
Zealand; on the right, grey dots correspond to Japan, and black ones (right-
most) to U.S. For every country, the lowest ω value corresponds to t = 1960. In
general, the highest ω corresponds to t = 2010 (with the exception of U.S.). To
facilitate visual inspection, the inset shows the same data, for the mentioned
countries, in logarithmic scale.
2
II. Life expectancy at ages 0-90
Figure S2 show the evolution of life expectancy at different ages, for four coun-
tries that have also been analyzed in the main text under the light of GEV.
Clearly, these plots fail to grasp the boldly increasing behaviour of average
maximum lifespan –which is evident in Figure 1 of the main text. This indicates
that, although valuable to anticipate general trends for the bulk of the popula-
tion, these tools are not meant to capture the behaviour of extreme scores.
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Figure S2: Evolution of the life expectancy at age for four of the countries anal-
ysed in the research work. The data is extracted from The Human Mortality
Database (http://www.mortality.org)
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